

Modal logics of finite direct powers of ω have the finite model property

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Causal $\preceq$ and *chronological* $\prec$ *future relations* in Minkowski spacetime $\mathbb{R}^n$:

$$(x_1, \dots, x_n) \preceq (y_1, \dots, y_n) \iff \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} (y_i - x_i)^2 \leq (x_n - y_n)^2 \ \& \ x_n \leq y_n,$$

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This talk:

The logics of direct powers of $(\omega, \leq)$ and $(\omega, <)$.

This talk is about
modal logics of **direct products of Kripke frames**,
their **finite model property**,
and **local finiteness**.

Language: a countable set VAR (propositional variables), Boolean connectives, a unary connective $\Diamond$ ($\Box$ abbreviates $\neg\Diamond\neg$).

Normal modal logics: Definition 1

A set of modal formulas L is a *normal modal logic* if L contains

- all tautologies
- $\Diamond\perp \leftrightarrow \perp$, $\Diamond(p \vee q) \leftrightarrow \Diamond p \vee \Diamond q$

and is closed under MP, Sub, and Mon:
if $(\varphi \rightarrow \psi) \in L$, then $(\Diamond\varphi \rightarrow \Diamond\psi) \in L$.

Normal modal logics: Definition 2

A *modal algebra* is a BA endowed with a unary operation that distributes over finite disjunctions.

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Kripke semantics

A (*Kripke*) *frame* F is a pair (W, R) , where $W \neq \emptyset$, $R \subseteq W \times W$.

A *model* M on F is a pair (F, θ) where $\theta : \text{VAR} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(W)$.

$M, x \models p$ iff $x \in \theta(p)$, $M, x \models \Diamond\varphi$ iff $M, y \models \varphi$ for some y with xRy .

$\text{Log}(F) = \{\varphi \mid F \models \varphi\}$, where $M, x \models \varphi$ for every M on F and every x in M .

The *algebra* $\text{Alg}(F)$ of a frame $F = (W, R)$ is the modal algebra $(\mathcal{P}(W), R^{-1})$.

Hence: $F \models \varphi$ iff $\text{Alg}(F) \models \varphi = \top$.

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A logic L has the *finite model property* if L is the logic of a class $\mathcal{C}$ of finite frames/algebras: $L = \bigcap \{\text{Log}(F) \mid F \in \mathcal{C}\}$.

An algebra A is *locally finite* if every finitely generated subalgebra of A is finite.

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
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$\text{Alg}(F)$ is locally finite $\Rightarrow$ $\text{Log}(F)$ has the finite model property
 $\Leftarrow$

Let $F = (W, R)$ be a frame. A partition $\mathcal{A}$ of W is *tuned* if for every $U, V \in \mathcal{A}$,

$$\exists u \in U \exists v \in V uRv \Rightarrow \forall u \in U \exists v \in V uRv.$$

F is said to be *tunable* if every finite partition $\mathcal{A}$ of F admits a finite tuned refinement.




The key tool: The algebra of F is locally finite iff F is tunable.

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TFAE:

- $\mathcal{A}$ is tuned in F
- The equivalence $\sim$ defined by $\mathcal{A} = W/\sim$ satisfies the condition

$$\sim \circ R \subseteq R \circ \sim,$$

i.e., $\sim$ is a bisimulation w.r.t. R on W .

- $x \mapsto [x]_{\mathcal{A}}$ is a p-morphism from F onto the “Franzen’s filtration” $(\mathcal{A}, R_{\mathcal{A}})$, where for $U, V \in \mathcal{A}$,

$$UR_{\mathcal{A}}V \text{ iff } \exists u \in U \exists v \in V uRv$$


[Seegerberg, K.: Franzen’s proof of Bull’s theorem. *Ajatus* 35, 216–221 (1973)]

- Finite unions of elements of $\mathcal{A}$ form a subalgebra of $\text{Alg}(F)$.

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Example: The logics/algebras of $(\omega, \leq)$ and $(\omega, <)$

Bull, 1965; Schindler, 1970/Seeger, 1970: $\text{Log}(\omega, \leq)$ and $\text{Log}(\omega, <)$ have the fmp.

Moreover, the algebras $\text{Alg}(\omega, \leq)$ and $\text{Alg}(\omega, <)$ are locally finite, since $(\omega, \leq)$ and $(\omega, <)$ are (easily!) tunable:


refine a given finite partition $\mathcal{A}$ of ω in such a way that

- all elements of the refinement $\mathcal{B}$ are infinite or singletons, and
- singletons form an initial segment of ω .

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
The key tool: The algebra of F is locally finite iff F is tunable.

A logic L is *locally finite* (or *locally tabular*) if for all $k < \omega$ there are only finitely many k -formulas (i.e., formulas in k variables) up to $\leftrightarrow_L$.

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
Every finitely generated Lindenbaum-Tarski (i.e., free) algebra of L is finite.

The variety of L -algebras is *locally finite*, i.e., every finitely generated L -algebra is finite.

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Malcev, 1970s: The variety $\text{Var}(A)$ of a finite signature is LF iff there exists $f : \omega \rightarrow \omega$ s.t. the cardinality of a subalgebra of A generated by $m < \omega$ elements is $\leq f(m)$.

Shehtman & Sh, 2016: $\text{Log}(F)$ is LF iff there exists $f : \omega \rightarrow \omega$ s.t. every finite partition $\mathcal{A}$ of F admits a tuned finite refinement $\mathcal{B}$ with $|\mathcal{B}| \leq f(|\mathcal{A}|)$.


$Alg(\omega, \leq)$ and $Alg(\omega, <)$ are locally finite.

Seegerberg, 1971; Maksimova, 1975:

The logic of a transitive frame F is locally finite iff F is of finite height.

$Log(F)$ is LF $\Rightarrow$ $Alg(F)$ is LF $\Rightarrow$ $Log(F)$ has the FMP
 $\Leftarrow$ $\Leftarrow$

$Alg(F)$ is locally finite iff F is tunable



Example: $Alg(\omega, \preceq)$ and $Alg(\omega, \prec)$ are locally finite

Proof. The frames $(\omega, \preceq)$ and $(\omega, \prec)$ are tunable (easy).

$(\omega^n, \preceq)$ is the n -th direct power of $(\omega, \preceq)$, i.e., for $x, y \in \omega^n$
 $x \preceq y$ iff $x(i) \leq y(i)$ for all $i < n$.

$(\omega^n, \prec)$ is the direct power $(\omega, \prec)^n$:
 $x \prec y$ iff $x(i) < y(i)$ for all $i < n$.

Theorem

For all finite $n > 0$, $Alg(\omega^n, \preceq)$ and $Alg(\omega^n, \prec)$ are locally finite.

Corollary

The logics $Log(\omega^n, \preceq)$ and $Log(\omega^n, \prec)$ have the finite model property.

Induction step

Consider a non-empty $V \subseteq \omega^n$. Put

$$\begin{aligned} J(V) &= \{i < n \mid \exists x \in V \exists y \in V \ x(i) \neq y(i)\}, \\ I(V) &= \{i < n \mid \forall x \in V \forall y \in V \ x(i) = y(i)\} = n \setminus J(V). \end{aligned}$$

The *hull* of V is the set

$$\overline{V} = \{y \in \omega^n \mid \forall i \in I(V) (y(i) = x(i) \text{ for some } (x \in V))\}.$$

V is *pre-cofinal* if it is cofinal in its hull, i.e.,

$$\forall x \in \overline{V} \exists y \in V \ x \preceq y.$$

A partition $\mathcal{A}$ of $V \subseteq \omega^n$ is *monotone* if

- all of its elements are pre-cofinal, and
- for all $x, y \in V$ such that $x \preceq y$ we have $J([x]_{\mathcal{A}}) \subseteq J([y]_{\mathcal{A}})$,

where $[x]_{\mathcal{A}}$ is the element of $\mathcal{A}$ containing x .

If $\mathcal{A}$ is a monotone partition of ω^n , then $\mathcal{A}$ is tuned in $(\omega^n, \preceq)$ and in $(\omega^n, \prec)$. Let $\mathcal{A}, B \in \mathcal{A}$, $x, y \in A$, $x \preceq z \in B$. Let u be the following point in ω^n :

$$u(i) = y(i) + 1 \text{ for } i \in J(\mathcal{A}), \text{ and } u(i) = z(i) \text{ for } i \in I(\mathcal{A}). \quad (2)$$

We have

$$\{i < n \mid u(i) \neq z(i)\} \subseteq n \setminus I(\mathcal{A}) = J(\mathcal{A}) \subseteq J(B);$$

the first inclusion follows from (2), the second follows from the monotonicity of $\mathcal{A}$. Hence, we have $u(i) = z(i)$ for all $i \in I(B)$. By the definition of $\overline{B}$, we have $u \in \overline{B}$. Since B is cofinal in $\overline{B}$ (we use monotonicity again), for some $u' \in B$ we have $u \preceq u'$.

By (2), we have $y(i) \leq u(i)$ for all $i < n$: indeed, $y(i) = x(i) \leq z(i) = u(i)$ for $i \in I(\mathcal{A})$, and $u(i) = y(i) + 1$ otherwise. Thus, $y \preceq u$, and so $y \preceq u'$. It follows that $\mathcal{A}$ is tuned in $(\omega^n, \preceq)$.

In order to show that $\mathcal{A}$ is tuned in $(\omega^n, \prec)$, we now assume that $x \prec z$. Then we have $y(i) < u(i)$ for all $i < n$, since $y(i) = x(i) < z(i) = u(i)$ for $i \in I(\mathcal{A})$, and $u(i) = y(i) + 1$ otherwise. Hence $y \prec u$. Since $u \preceq u'$, we have $y \prec u'$, as required.

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a finite partition of ω^n .

For $k \in \omega$ let $U_k = \{y \in \omega^n \mid y(i) \geq k \text{ for all } i < n\}$. Since $\mathcal{A}$ is finite, we can choose a natural number k_0 such that

$$\text{if } y \in U_{k_0}, \text{ then } [y]_{\mathcal{A}} \text{ is cofinal in } \omega^n. \quad (3)$$

Indeed, if $A \in \mathcal{A}$ is not cofinal in ω^n , then $U_{k_0} \cap A = \emptyset$ for some $k_A < \omega$; hence, (3) holds whenever k_0 is greater than every such k_A .

It follows that the partition $\mathcal{A}|_{U_{k_0}}$ is monotone: it consists of sets that are cofinal in ω^n (and so, they are obviously pre-cofinal), and $J(A) = n$ for all $A \in \mathcal{A}|_{U_{k_0}}$.

We are going to extend this partition step by step in order to obtain a sequence of finite monotone partitions of $U_{k_0-1}, \dots, U_0 = \omega^n$, respectively refining $\mathcal{A}|_{U_{k_0-1}}, \dots, \mathcal{A}|_{U_0} = \mathcal{A}$.

First, let us describe the construction for the case $k_0 = 1$, the crucial technical step of the proof.

Claim A. Suppose that $\mathcal{B}$ is a finite monotone partition of U_1 refining $\mathcal{A}|_{U_1}$. Then there exists a finite monotone partition $\mathcal{C}$ of ω^n refining $\mathcal{A}$ such that $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$. $\mathcal{C}$ will be the union of $\mathcal{B}$ and a partition of the set

$$V = \{x \in \omega^n \mid x(i) = 0 \text{ for some } i < n\} = \omega^n \setminus U_1.$$

To construct the required partition of V , for $I \subseteq n$ put

$$V_I = \{x \mid \forall i < n (i \in I \Leftrightarrow x(i) = 0)\}.$$

Then $\{V_I \mid \emptyset \neq I \subseteq n\}$ is a partition of V , $V_0 = U_1$.

Each V_I considered with the order $\preceq$ on it is isomorphic to $(\omega^{n-|I|}, \preceq)$. Thus, by the induction hypothesis, for a non-empty $I \subseteq n$ we have:

Each finite partition of V_I admits a finite monotone refinement. (4)

For $I \subseteq n$, by induction on the cardinality of I we define a finite partition $\mathcal{C}_I$ of V_I .

We put $\mathcal{C}_\emptyset = \mathcal{B}$.

Assume that I is non-empty. Consider the projection $\text{Pr}_I : x \mapsto y$ such that $y(i) = 0$ whenever $i \in I$, and $y(i) = x(i)$ otherwise. Note that for all $K \subset I$, $x \in V_K$ implies $\text{Pr}_I(x) \in V_I$. Let $\mathcal{D}$ be the partition induced on V_I by the family

$$\mathcal{A} \cup \bigcup_{K \subset I} \{\text{Pr}_I(A) \mid A \in V_K\}. \quad (5)$$

By an immediate induction argument, $\mathcal{D}$ is finite. Let $\mathcal{C}_I$ be a finite monotone refinement of $\mathcal{D}$, which exists according to (4).

We put

$$\mathcal{C} = \bigcup_{I \subseteq n} \mathcal{C}_I.$$

Then $\mathcal{C}$ is a finite refinement of $\mathcal{A}$. We have to check monotonicity.

Every element A of $\mathcal{C}$ is pre-cofinal, because A is an element of a monotone partition $\mathcal{C}_I$ for some I . In order to check the second condition of monotonicity, we consider x, y in ω^n with $x \preceq y$ and show that

$$J([x]_{\mathcal{C}}) \subseteq J([y]_{\mathcal{C}}). \quad (6)$$

Let $x \in V_I$, $y \in V_K$ for some $I, K \subseteq n$. Since $x \preceq y$, we have $K \subseteq I$. If $K = I$, then (6) holds, since in this case $[x]_{\mathcal{C}}$ and $[y]_{\mathcal{C}}$ belong to the same monotone partition $\mathcal{C}_I$. Assume that $K \subset I$. In this case we have:

$$J([x]_{\mathcal{C}}) \subseteq J(\{\text{Pr}_I(y)\}_{\mathcal{C}}) \subseteq J(\{\text{Pr}_I([y]_{\mathcal{C}})\}) \subseteq J([y]_{\mathcal{C}}).$$

To check the first inclusion, we observe that $\text{Pr}_I(y)$ belongs to V_I (since $K \subset I$). This means that $[x]_{\mathcal{C}}$ and $\{\text{Pr}_I(y)\}_{\mathcal{C}}$ are elements of the same partition $\mathcal{C}_I$. We have $x \preceq \text{Pr}_I(y)$, since $x \in V_I$ and $x \preceq y$. Now the first inclusion follows from monotonicity of $\mathcal{C}_I$. By (5), $\{\text{Pr}_I([y]_{\mathcal{C}})\}$ is the union of some elements of $\mathcal{C}_I$ (since $K \subset I$ and $[y]_{\mathcal{C}} \in \mathcal{C}_K$); trivially, $\text{Pr}_I(y) \in \{\text{Pr}_I([y]_{\mathcal{C}})\}$, hence $\{\text{Pr}_I(y)\}_{\mathcal{C}}$ is a subset of $\{\text{Pr}_I([y]_{\mathcal{C}})\}$. This yields the second inclusion. The third inclusion is immediate from the definition. Thus, we have (6), which proves the claim.

From Claim A it is not difficult to obtain the following:

Claim B. Let $0 < k < \omega$. If $\mathcal{B}$ is a finite monotone partition of U_k refining $\mathcal{A}|_{U_k}$, then there exists a finite monotone partition $\mathcal{C}$ of U_{k-1} refining $\mathcal{A}|_{U_{k-1}}$ such that $\mathcal{B} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$. Consider the translation $\text{Tr} : U_{k-1} \rightarrow \omega^n$ taking $(x_i)_{i < n}$ to $(x_i - k + 1)_{i < n}$. Let $\mathcal{B}'$ be the set $\{\text{Tr}(A) \mid A \in \mathcal{B}\}$ of images of elements of $\mathcal{B}$ by Tr , and $\mathcal{A}'$ be the set $\{\text{Tr}(A) \mid A \in \mathcal{A}|_{U_{k-1}}\}$. Then $\mathcal{A}'$ is a partition of ω^n , $\mathcal{B}'$ is a finite monotone partition of U_1 refining $\mathcal{A}'|_{U_1}$. By Claim A, there exists a finite monotone partition $\mathcal{C}'$ of ω^n refining $\mathcal{A}'$ such that $\mathcal{B}' \subseteq \mathcal{C}'$. The family $\mathcal{C} = \{\text{Tr}^{-1}(A) \mid A \in \mathcal{C}'\}$ is the required partition of U_{k-1} .

Applying Claim B k_0 times, we obtain the required refinement of $\mathcal{A}$.

Question

Let frames F_1 and F_2 be tunable. Is the direct product $F_1 \times F_2$ tunable?

In the other words:

if $\text{Alg}(F_1)$ and $\text{Alg}(F_2)$ are LF, is the algebra $\text{Alg}(F_1 \times F_2)$ LF?

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Proposition. For every ordinal $\alpha > 0$, the algebras $\text{Alg}(\alpha, \leq)$, $\text{Alg}(\alpha, <)$ are LF.

Proof. The frames $(\alpha, \leq)$, $(\alpha, <)$ are tunable (an easy induction on α).

Conjecture

If $(\alpha_i)_{i < n}$ is a finite family of ordinals, then the algebras of the direct products $\prod_{i < n}(\alpha_i, \leq)$, $\prod_{i < n}(\alpha_i, <)$ are locally finite.

Question

Let $n > 1$. Are logics $Log(\omega^n, \preceq)$ and $Log(\omega^n, \prec)$ decidable or at least recursively axiomatizable?

In the one-dimensional case, decidability is a classical result ([Bull, 65](#); [Schindler, 1970](#); [Segerberg, 1970](#)).

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The algebras of the frames $(\omega^n, \preceq)$ and $(\omega^n, \prec)$ are locally finite, the logics of these frames are not (since these frames are of infinite height).

Bull, 1965: Every extension of $Log(\omega, \leq)$ has the finite model property.

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Let L be an extension of $Log(\omega^n, \preceq)$ for some finite $n > 1$. Does L have the finite model property?

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A **subframe** of (W, R) is the restriction $(V, R \cap (V \times V))$, where $V \neq \emptyset$.

Proposition. If the algebra of a frame F is locally finite, then the algebra of any subframe of F is also locally finite.

Proof. Given a partition $\mathcal{A}$ of a subframe G , consider the partition $\mathcal{A} \cup \{W \setminus V\}$ of F . Tune it, and collect elements that are subsets of G .

Corollary

For all finite n , if F is a subframe of $(\omega^n, \preceq)$ or of $(\omega^n, \prec)$, then $\text{Alg}(F)$ is locally finite, and $\text{Log}(F)$ has the finite model property.

(Glivenko, 1929)	$CL \vdash \varphi$	iff	$IL \vdash \neg\neg\varphi$
(Matsumoto, 1955)	$S5 \vdash \varphi$	iff	$S4 \vdash \neg\Box\neg\Box\varphi$

In Kripke semantics:

IL is the logic of partial orders,

CL is the logic of singletons, which are partial orders of height 1.

S4 is the logic of preorders,

S5 is the logic of equivalence relations, which are preorders of height 1.

Let $L[h]$ be the extension of a logic L with the axiom of height h .

$$IL[1] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } IL \vdash \neg\neg\varphi \qquad S4[1] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } S4 \vdash \Diamond\Box\varphi$$

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$$IL[2] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } IL \vdash ? \qquad S4[2] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } S4 \vdash ?$$

$$IL[3] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } IL \vdash ? \qquad S4[3] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } S4 \vdash ?$$

...

...

Formulas and logics of finite height

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{intermediate:} & b_0^1 = \perp, \quad b_{i+1}^1 = p_{i+1} \vee (p_{i+1} \rightarrow b_i^1) \\ \text{modal:} & b_0 = \perp, \quad b_{i+1} = p_{i+1} \rightarrow \Box(\Diamond p_{i+1} \vee b_i) \end{array}$$

$L[h]$ extends L with the formula of height h . In particular,

$$IL[1] = CL, \quad S4[1] = S5$$

The *k-canonical frame* of a logic L (the representation of the k -generated free algebra of L) is built from maximal L -consistent sets of k -formulas.

Shehtman, 1978: Let $k < \omega$. There exist formulas $\mathbf{B}_{h,k}$ (and their intuitionistic analogs $\mathbf{B}_{h,k}^1$) such that for every x in the k -canonical frame F_k of $S4$ (of Int)

$$\mathbf{B}_{h,k} \in x \iff \text{the depth of } x \text{ in } F_k \text{ is less than or equal to } h.$$

Theorem

Let $k < \omega$. For all k -formulas φ we have:

- $IL[h+1] \vdash \varphi$ iff $IL \vdash \bigwedge_{i \leq h} ((\varphi \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k}^1) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k}^1)$;
- $S4[h+1] \vdash \varphi$ iff $S4 \vdash \bigwedge_{i \leq h} (\Box(\Box\varphi \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k}) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k})$.

In particular, for $h = 0$ the formulas $\mathbf{B}_{0,k}$ are $\perp$ for all $k < \omega$:

$$IL[1] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } IL \vdash \neg\neg\varphi, \quad S4[1] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } S4 \vdash \Diamond\Box\varphi.$$

Analogues of the above translations exist whenever finite-height extensions of a logic are locally finite.

Segerberg, 1971; Kuznetsov, 1971; Komori, 1975: All $S4[h]$, $IL[h]$ are LF.

A logic is said to be *k-finite* if, up to the equivalence in it, there exist only finitely many *k*-formulas.

Hence, a logic is locally finite iff it is *k*-finite for every finite *k*.

L is *pretransitive* if there is a formula $\Diamond^*(p)$ ('master modality') s.t. $\Diamond^*(\varphi)$ expresses the satisfiability of φ in cones on models of L .

Pretransitive examples:

$K4, GL, wK4 = [\Diamond\Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond p \vee p]$, $K5 = [\Diamond p \rightarrow \Box\Diamond p]$, $[\Diamond^n p \rightarrow \Diamond^m p]$ for $n > m$, (expanding) products of transitive logics

Shetman, Sh, 2016: Every 1-finite (a fortiori, locally finite) modal logic is a pretransitive logic of finite height.

Makinson, 1981: In general, the converse is not true!

There exists a pretransitive L s.t. none of the logics $L[h]$, $h > 0$, are 1-finite: put $L = [\Diamond^3 p \rightarrow \Diamond^2 p]$.

The *height of a polymodal frame* $(W, (R_i)_{i < n})$ is the height of the preorder $(W, (\bigcup_{i < n} R_i)^*)$.

In the pretransitive case, the formulas of finite height can be defined:

$$B_0 = \perp, \quad B_h = p_h \rightarrow \Box^*(\Diamond^* p_h \vee B_{h-1}).$$

Theorem

Let $\mathbb{L}$ be a pretransitive logic, $h, k < \omega$. If $\mathbb{L}[h]$ is k -finite, then:

- (a) For every $i \leq h$, there exists a formula $\mathbf{B}_{i,k}$ such that $\mathbf{B}_{i,k} \in x$ iff the depth of x in the k -canonical frame of $\mathbb{L}$ is less than or equal to i .
- (b) For all k -formulas φ ,

$$\mathbb{L}[h+1] \vdash \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad \mathbb{L} \vdash \bigwedge_{i \leq h} (\Box^*(\Box^* \varphi \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k}) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k}).$$

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Theorem

Let L be a pretransitive logic, $h, k < \omega$. If $L[h]$ is k -finite, then:

- (a) For every $i \leq h$, there exists a formula $\mathbf{B}_{i,k}$ such that $\mathbf{B}_{i,k} \in x$ iff the depth of x in the k -canonical frame of L is less than or equal to i .
- (b) For all k -formulas φ ,

$$L[h+1] \vdash \varphi \quad \text{iff} \quad L \vdash \bigwedge_{i \leq h} (\Box^*(\Box^* \varphi \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k}) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}_{i,k}).$$

Remark. The inconsistent logic $L[0]$ is locally finite, hence for every pretransitive L

$$L[1] \vdash \varphi \text{ iff } L \vdash \Diamond^* \Box^* \varphi \tag{1}$$

[Kudinov, Sh, 2011](#): A more direct (syntactic) proof of (1).

Contrary to the transitive case, k -finiteness of $L[h]$ depends on h and k .

k -finiteness $\Rightarrow$ local finiteness?

Maksimova, 1975:

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This equivalence holds for many families of modal logics.

But it does not hold in general...

Theorem

There exists a unimodal 1-finite logic which is not locally finite.

Proof.

Let $F = (\omega + 1, R)$, where xRy iff $x \leq y$ or $x = \omega$.



1-finiteness of the logic of F is a straightforward exercise.

Recall: If the logic of a frame is LF, then the logic of any its subframe is LF.

The restriction of the cluster $(\omega + 1, R)$ onto ω is the frame $(\omega, \leq)$, which is of infinite height. Thus $\text{Log}(\omega + 1, R)$ is not locally finite. $\square$

Corollary. There exists a unimodal 1-finite algebra which is not locally finite.

Proof. Consider free algebras of a non-locally finite, but 1-finite logic.





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Question

Does 2-finiteness of a modal logic imply local finiteness?

At least, does k -finiteness imply local finiteness, for some fixed k for all modal logics? For modal algebras?

The same questions are open in the intuitionistic case.





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Thank you!