# On expressibility and axiomatization of modal logics of distances

Ilya Shapirovsky

Joint work with Gabriel Agnew, Uzias Gutierrez-Hougardy, John Harding, Hannah Himelright, Jackson West, and Andrew Meléndrez Zerwekh on the project "Research Training Group in Logic and Its Application 2023 – 2024"

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> > UTEP/NMSU Workshop November 2, 2024

In this talk I will announce recent developments, obtained by our group in the project *"Research Training Group in Logic and Its Application"*, 2023 – 2024.

- ➡ New theoretical results [Gabriel Agnew, Uzias Gutierrez-Hougardy, John Harding, Jackson West, Sh].
- Related software tools [Hannah Himelright and Andrew Meléndrez Zerwekh ].

Let X be a metric space. For instance, X can be the real line  $\mathbb{R}$ , or the usual Euclidean plane  $\mathbb{R}^2$ , or any other set equipped with a distance function.

Two points are said to be *close*, if they are at a distance less than 1.

For a set  $Y \subseteq X$ , let  $\langle c \rangle Y$  be the set of points z such that each z is close to <u>some</u> point in Y:

 $\langle c \rangle Y = \{ z \mid d(z, y) < 1 \text{ for some } y \in Y \}$ 

Y is the red closed ball,  $\langle c \rangle Y$  is the blue open ball:



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*Modal terms* are build using the operations of union, intersection, complement, and the operation  $\langle c \rangle$ . The *modal logic of closeness*  $Log_c(X)$  is the set of all valid in X statements  $T \subseteq S$ , where T, S are modal terms.

Easy examples:  $Y \subseteq \langle c \rangle Y$  is true in all  $\mathbb{R}^n$ ;  $\langle c \rangle \langle c \rangle Y \subseteq \langle c \rangle Y$  is not valid in unbounded spaces.



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It is less trivial to check that

we have in 
$$\mathbb{R}$$
, but not in  $\mathbb{R}^2$ :  
(c)  $Y_1 \cap \langle c \rangle Y_2 \cap \langle c \rangle Y_3 \subseteq \bigcup_{1 \le i \ne j \le 3} \langle c \rangle (Y_i \cap \langle c \rangle Y_j)$   
we have in  $\mathbb{R}^2$ , but not in  $\mathbb{R}^3$ :  
(c)  $Y_1 \cap \ldots \cap \langle c \rangle Y_6 \subseteq \bigcup_{1 \le i \ne j \le 6} \langle c \rangle (Y_i \cap \langle c \rangle Y_j)$ 

In fact, we have:

Theorem (Agnew, Gutierrez-Hougardy, Harding, West, Sh)  $\operatorname{Log}_{c}(\mathbb{R}) \supseteq \operatorname{Log}_{c}(\mathbb{R}^{2}) \supseteq \operatorname{Log}_{c}(\mathbb{R}^{3}) \supseteq \operatorname{Log}_{c}(\mathbb{R}^{4}) \supseteq \ldots$ 

More details will be given in Gabriel's talk in a few minutes.







Two points are said to be *far*, if they are at a distance greater than 1.

Now for a set  $Y \subseteq X$ , let  $\langle f \rangle Y$  be the set of points z such that each z is far from some point in Y:

 $\langle f \rangle Y = \{ z \mid d(z, y) > 1 \text{ for some } y \in Y \}$ 







The corresponding statements form  $\text{Log}_{f}(X)$ , the *modal logic of farness*. Easy examples:  $Y \subseteq \langle f \rangle Y$  is not valid in  $\mathbb{R}^{n}$ , while  $Y \subseteq \langle f \rangle \langle f \rangle Y$  is valid.

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Theorem (Agnew, Gutierrez-Hougardy, Harding, West, Sh) For every dimension *n*, there exists k(n) such that for all m > k(n),  $\text{Log}_{f}(\mathbb{R}^{n}) \neq \text{Log}_{f}(\mathbb{R}^{m})$ .

More details will be given by Uzias in his talk.

#### Axiomatization and decidability

In a general setting, *modal logic* is defined for every relational structure X (*frame*): for a binary relation R on X, put  $\Diamond_R Y = \{z \mid zRy \text{ for some } y \in Y\}$ . The set Log X of valid in X modal statements is called the *modal logic* of X.

Axiomatization problem: Describe a set  $\Psi$  of formulas such that  $\log X$  is the set of logical consequences of  $\Psi$ . In this case,  $\Psi$  is called a *complete axiomatization* of  $\log X$ .

Finite axiomatizability: Does the logic have a finite complete axiomatization?

*Decidability:* Decidability of Log X means that there exists an algorithm correctly deciding which statements are valid in X, and which are not.

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Modal logics of relations induced by distance in a metric space:

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- F. Wolter and M. Zakharyaschev. A logic for metric and topology, 2005.
- A. Kurucz, F. Wolter, and M. Zakharyaschev. Modal logics for metric spaces: Open problems, 2005.
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[Agnew, Gutierrez-Hougardy, Harding, West, Sh]:

- 1. A complete axiomatization was found for the logic of farness on the class  ${\rm Unb}$  of unbounded metric spaces.
- 2. This logic and all  $\operatorname{Log}_{\mathrm{f}} \mathbb{R}^n$  are not finitely axiomatizable.
- 3. A finite complete axiomatization was found for the logic of farness on the class Ult of ultrametric spaces.
- 4. The logic of farness on  ${\rm Unb}$  and the logic of farness on  ${\rm Ult}$  are decidable.

More details will be given by Jackson in his talk.

# Non-finitely axiomatizable logics and the m-equivalence decision problem

The finite axiomatizability problem is closely related to the following property:

Two structures F and G are said to be *m*-equivalent, if they are indistinguishable by modal formulas containing at most *m* propositional variables. In symbols:  $F \sim_m G$ .

Lemma. Let L be a logic. Assume that for every m there are structures  $F_m$ ,  $G_m$  such that L is included in  $\text{Log } F_m$ , L is not included in  $\text{Log } G_m$ , and

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It can be quite non-trivial to "manually" recognize m-equivalence, even for a pair of very small structures. However, on finite frames, this problem reduces to analyzing a finite family of quotient-frames, and so is decidable.

[Himelright and Zerwekh]: A Python implementation of an algorithm solving the *m*-equivalence problem on finite frames.

Hannah and Andrew will give more details in their talk.

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# Thank you!